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1.1. Introduction. Why do humans co-operate as much as they do?  Stated at this level of generality, it seems obvious that this question has no single answer. The same person may co-operate for very different reasons in different situations, depending on the circumstances in which the cooperation occurs, the behavior, and motivation of others with whom they cooperate and so on. Moreover, both casual observation and (as we shall see) experimental evidence suggest that people differ in type, with self-interest playing a larger or more exclusive role in explaining co-operative (and non-cooperative) behavior   among some people, and non-self-interested motives (which may themselves take a variety of different forms but often involve dispositions toward conditional rather than unconditional cooperation) playing a larger role among other subjects. 
Nonetheless, one finds in philosophy, social science, and evolutionary biology a number of different stylized accounts of why co-operation occurs, often presented as mutually exclusive alternatives. In what follows I explore some of these, with an eye to assessing their explanatory adequacy.  I begin with the familiar idea that cooperative behavior can be understood simply as an equilibrium in a repeated game played by self-interested players. I suggest there are substantial empirical and theoretical problems with this idea and that the empirical evidence predominantly supports the view that cooperation often involves interactions among players of different types, some of whom are self-interested in the sense that they care only about their own monetary pay-offs and others of whom are best understood as conditional cooperators of one kind or another, or, as they are sometimes called, strong reciprocators.  (See, e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003, Henrich et al. 2004, and the essays in Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, and Fehr, 2005. Mantzavinos, 2001 also emphasizes  the importance of conditional cooperation – see especially pp 101ff) Conditional cooperators (CCs) differ among themselves but for our purposes we may think of them as having at least one of the following two features: 1) in some circumstances CCs cooperate with others who have cooperated or who they believe will cooperate  with them, even when the choice to cooperate is not pay-off maximizing  for the CCs and 2) in some circumstances CCs do not cooperate with (and may punish or sanction) others who  behave in a non- cooperative ways (or who they expect to behave non-cooperatively)  even when non-cooperation is not pay-off maximizing for the CCs.   Typically, CCs respond not just to the pay-offs they receive as a result of others’ behavior but to the intentions and beliefs which they believe lie behind others’ behavior (presumably in part because these have implications for the possibility of future cooperation.)   
This has the consequence that the preferences of conditional cooperators (and their behavior) is   very complex, and context sensitive – we cannot, for example, adequately predict their behavior across different contexts simply by supposing that they have, in addition to self-interested preferences, stable “other regarding” preferences regarding pay-offs to others that are independent of their beliefs about the behavior and intentions of those others.  I suggest that one important role of social norms (and more generally social and moral rules, and institutions) that one often finds governing real life human cooperative interactions is to deal with the indeterminacy and unpredictability that would otherwise be present (that is, in the absence of norms) in the interactions of conditional cooperators with one another and with more purely selfish types. Thus rather than thinking of appeals to preferences for reciprocation and conditional cooperation, on the one hand, and appeals to social norms as competing explanations of cooperative behavior, I instead see these as complimentary—at least in many cases, conditional cooperators need norms if they are to cooperate effectively and norms require conditional cooperators with a willingness to sanction for their successful enforcement.   Put slightly differently, the high levels of cooperation sometimes achieved by humans depends not just on our   possession of social preferences of an appropriate sort but on   our capacity for what Alan Gibbard (1990) calls “normative governance” – our ability to  be guided by or to conform our behavior to norms.  Moreover, different people are able to   achieve common conformity to the same norms despite being (in other respects) motivationally fairly heterogeneous. This capacity is crucial to the ability to achieve cooperative solutions to the social dilemmas human beings face—social preferences (whether for conditional or unconditional cooperation) by themselves are not enough.  
	1. 2. Self Interest in Repeated Games. One familiar account of human cooperation – call it the “Self- Interest in Repeated Games” (SIRG) account-- goes like this. Assume first that we are dealing with subjects who  are “rational” (their preferences satisfy the usual axioms of expected utility theory)  and  are entirely  “self-interested” (“Self-interest” is a far from transparent notion but for present purposes, assume this  implies that people care only about their own material pay-offs—their monetary rewards in  the experiments discussed below.) Assume also that interactions are two –person or bilateral and that in particular two players find themselves in a “social dilemma”: there are gains for both players (in comparison to the baseline outcome in which each chooses a non –cooperative strategy) which can be obtained from mutual choice of cooperative strategies, but a non-cooperative choice is individually rational for each if they interact only once. Assume, however, that  their interaction is repeated – in particular,  that it   has the structure of a  repeated two person game of indefinite length,    and  that certain other conditions are met—the players care  about  their future sufficiently (do not discount too heavily) and  they  have accurate information about  the choices of  the other player.  For many   games meeting these conditions, the mutual choice of a cooperative strategy is a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game​[1]​. To take what is perhaps the best known example, mutual choice of tit for tat is a Nash equilibrium of a repeated prisoner’s dilemma of indefinite length, assuming that the players have sufficiently high discount rates and accurate information about one another’s play.  This (it is claimed) “explains” why cooperation occurs (when and to the extent it does) among self-interested players.
     An important part of the appeal of this approach, in the eyes of its proponents, is that it is “parsimonious” (Binmore, 2007) in the sense of not requiring the postulation of “other regarding” preferences to explain co-operation.  Instead, co-operative behavior is explained just in terms of   self- interested preferences which we already know are at work in many other contexts. 
  I do not wish to deny that this SIRG account isolates one important set of considerations which help to explain co-operation. (See below for more on this.) Nonetheless, when taken as a full or exclusive explanation of co-operative behavior the approach is subject to a number of criticisms, both theoretical and empirical. In what follows, I explore and assess some of these. 
1.3. Theory: At the theoretical level, while it is true that cooperative strategies are among the Nash equilibria of games like the  repeated prisoners dilemma, it is also true that a very large number of  non- cooperative strategies (like mutual defection on every move) are among the Nash equilibria of the repeated game. Moreover, philosophical folklore to the contrary, it is simply not true   that among these multiple Nash equilibria, those involving highly co-operative strategies are somehow singled out or favored on some other set of grounds.   For example, it is false   that tit for tat is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in a repeated PD, still less that it is the only such ESS.   As Binmore (1994, pp. 198ff ) points out,   in Axelrod’s well known computer simulation, it is   not true that tit for tat  “won” in the sense of being much more highly represented  than  less nice competitors. In fact, the actual outcome in Axelrod’s tournament approximates a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which tit for tat is the most common strategy, but is only used a relatively small portion (fifteen percent) of the time, with other less cooperative strategies also being frequently used.  When paired against other mixes of strategies besides those used by Axelrod, tit for tat is sometime even less successful.​[2]​  Thus what SIRG accounts (at least of the sort we have been considering) seem to show at best is that it is possible for co-operative play to be sustained in a repeated two person social dilemma (or alternatively, they explain why, if the players are already at a cooperative equilibrium, they will continue to cooperate rather than deviating from this equilibrium). However, given the large number of non co-operative equilibria  in many repeated games involving social dilemmas,  SIRG analyses  do not by themselves tell us much about why or when cooperative (rather than non-cooperative) outcomes occur in the first place. 
In addition, many social dilemmas are not bilateral but rather involve a much larger number of players—for example, they may take the form of n person public goods games for large n.  Theoretical analysis (e.g., Boyd and Richerson, 1988) suggests that it   is much more difficult for co-operative behavior to emerge among purely self-interested players in such multi-person games (in comparison with two person games) when such games are repeated.  This is so not only because information about the play of all the players is less likely to be public but also  because the strategy  that is used to enforce co-operation in the two person game (playing non-co-operatively  when  the other player   has played non-cooperatively on a previous move) is a much  more blunt or less targeted instrument in games involving larger numbers of players: in such games choosing to play non co-operatively   will impose costs on all players, rather than just those who have been uncooperative.  For example, non-contribution to a public good in order to sanction the non- contribution of other players in a previous round of play will harm the  other contributors as well as non-contributors and will presumably encourage contributors to be less cooperative in subsequent rounds. Indeed, in agreement with this analysis, under the conditions that we are presently envisioning (players cannot sanction non-cooperators, or avoid interacting with them) it is found as an empirical matter (both in experiments and in observation of behavior in the field) that cooperation in repeated public goods games declines to relatively low levels under repeated play.  As we shall see, defenders of SIRG accounts   often contend that this decline supports their claim that people are self-interested – their idea being that the decline occurs because self-interested subjects do not initially realize that non cooperation is pay-off maximizing, but then gradually learn this under repeated play of the game. On the other hand, it is also clear from both experiment and field observation that substantial levels of cooperation can be sustained under repetition in public goods games when the right sort of addition structure is present – e.g., arrangements that allow the more cooperative to identify and interact preferentially with one another and to avoid free riders or arrangements which allow for the sanctioning of non-cooperators. (See below.)  Thus, although this moral is not usually drawn by defenders of the SIRG analysis, what  the empirical evidence   seems to suggest  is   that  whether or not  people are self-interested, cooperative outcomes in social dilemmas typically are typically  not automatically sustained just on the basis of  repeated interactions in groups of substantial size.  This again suggests that when cooperation occurs in such circumstances (as it does with some frequency) it is not well explained just by pointing to results about the existence of cooperative equilibria in repeated games, involving selfish subjects.  More is involved. 
Yet another theoretical issue for the SIRG approach concerns the structure of the game being played. The strong tendency in much of the literature to focus on what Philip Kitcher calls “compulsory”   repeated  games  (Kitcher, 1993) — that is, games in which  there  is no move available which allows the  subject  to opt out of the repeated interaction. The repeated prisoner’s dilemma has this character, as does the repeated n person public goods game envisioned above—subjects must interact with one another, with the only question being whether they will interact cooperatively or instead defect. Yet in many real life situations   subjects have a choice about whether to enter into an interaction which presents the    possibility of co-operation/defection or instead to go solo and avoid the interaction​[3]​. For example, they may either hunt cooperatively in a group or hunt alone. Relatedly, subjects also have a choice about who they select as a potential partner for cooperation   and who they avoid. This difference between mandatory and optional games matters for several reasons. First, insofar as the situation allows for the possibility of opting out of any form of repeated interaction, we need to   explain why (rather than just assuming that) repeated interaction occurs (to the extent that it does).   If we simply assume a game in which there is repeated interaction, we may be assuming away a large part of the explanatory problem we face, which is why a repeated game with a certain interaction structure occurs in the first place​[4]​.  Second, and relatedly, both theoretical analysis and experimental evidence (some of which is described below) suggest that when players are allowed to decide whether to interact and with whom to interact, this can considerably boost the incidence of co-operation.  
1.4. Empirical evidence. I turn now to a discussion of some   empirical evidence bearing on the adequacy of the SIRG account – mainly but not exclusively experimental evidence.     
	In some two person repeated games such as repeated   prisoners’ dilemmas and   trust games, subjects often achieve relatively high levels of cooperation, although cooperation declines   fairly steeply when subjects know that they are in the final rounds.      For example, Andreoni and Miller  (1993) report results from a repeated PD of ten rounds in which  roughly  60%  of subjects begin by cooperating, with this proportion dropping  gradually in earlier rounds (50 %  cooperation in the 5th round)  and then steeply to roughly 10% by the tenth round.   In repeated public goods games with a substantial number of players, the generic result again is that many subjects begin with a relatively high level of contribution (40-60 percent of subjects in Western countries contribute something) but then contributions decline   substantially as the game is repeated, eventually reaching a level at which a core of only about ten per cent of subjects continue to contribute.
	These results do not of course tell us why subjects behave as they do in repeated games. However,  it is commonly argued (e.g. Binmore, 2007, Samuelson, 2005) that this pattern   is broadly consistent with the  SIRG account—in games like a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, the   high levels of cooperation observed in the early and middle periods of the game are just what one would expect from self-interested players and the sharp  declines in cooperation at the end of the game are just the sort of “end game” effects one would expect among self-interested players who recognize that their choices will   no longer influence whether others play cooperatively.  The initially high levels of contribution in public goods games are attributed to “confusion” (failure to understand the game that they are playing) and the decline in cooperative behavior as the game is repeated is attributed to the players gradually learning the structure of the game and coming to realize that that defection is the self-interested strategy.   
1.5. Social Preferences? Others (Camerer and Fehr, 2004, Gintis, 2006) have challenged this interpretation. One popular line of argument goes like this: if players are purely self-interested  (and if they are also fully rational and understand  the strategic structure of the situation they face) then while (as we have seen) they may cooperate   in  repeated games,  they should not do so in one-shot games in which the which the Nash equilibria all involve non-cooperative choices,  at least when care is taken to insure that the players believe that  the possibility of future interactions and reputational effects are absent. However, this is contrary to the rather high levels of co-operation that are observed experimentally in many one shot games involving social dilemmas.  For example,  in one-shot  PDs 40 to 60 % of players in developed countries cooperate and in one shot public goods games in developed countries, subjects   contribute on average about half of their endowment, although again there is a great deal of variation, with a number of subjects contributing nothing. In one-shot trust games subjects in developed countries, on average subjects   transfer  around 0.4-0.6 of their  stake  and  trustors return   approximately the result transferred  (when the self-interested choice is to return nothing), although there is once more considerable individual variation. In one shot ultimatum games in developed countries, mean offers of proposers are about 0.4 of the stake and offers below  0.2 are rejected half the time. Offers of 0.5 are also common. Of course, it also appears to be true that people behave cooperatively in one shot interactions in real life in which non-cooperation is the self-interested strategy: they leave tips in restaurants to which they think they will never return, they give accurate directions to strangers when this requires some effort and so on.
		Also relevant in this connection are the results of a fascinating series of cross cultural experiments (described in Henrich, 2004) in which various experimental games were played in a number of, different small scale societies in Asia, Africa, and South America. In these games, there was considerably more variation in results than in developed countries like the contemporary U.S.  For example, among the Machiguenga in Peru, one-shot ultimatum game   offers had a mean 0.26 and mode of 0.15 (far lower than mean and modal offers in developed societies)   and almost no offers were rejected.  In contrast, among the Lamerela   in Indonesia offers in excess of 0.50 (hyper-fair offers) were common and there was   frequent rejection, even of hyper-fair offers.   A similar variation was found in public goods games and trust games. 
	Moreover, in at least some cases these results appear to correlate with features of social life in the societies in question. For example, the Machiguenga are described as “socially disconnected” by anthropologists, with economic life centering on the individual family and little opportunity for anonymous transactions.   By contrast, the Lamerala are a whaling society in which there is a high degree of cooperative hunting and food sharing   and in which it is common for people to reject gifts out of concern that this will place them under a strong obligation to reciprocate.  The Orma in Kenya make relatively high contributions in public goods games (both in comparison to many other small scale societies and the contemporary US:  0.58 of their endowments). Participants in this game associated it with a harambee, “a Swahili word for the institution of village level contributions for public goods projects such as building a school” (Ensminger, 2004, p. 376) and in fact a harambee collection was going on at the time the public goods game was played. It seems plausible that the relatively high level of contribution was at least in part a reflection of the willingness of the participants to think of it as an instance of this practice.    
		 A number of writers   take such observations to  show  that in  addition to whatever self-interested preferences people may possess, many people also  have non- self- interested (or “social”) preferences. (These may include preferences to sanction or reciprocate negatively in as well as preferences that benefit others.)   For example, many of the contributors to the Henrich et al. volume (e.g. Camerer and Fehr, 2004), take themselves to be using one-shot experimental games to “measure” social preferences that exist in real life social interactions even though these take the form of repeated games in the societies under study. They believe that the use of one-shot games allows them to disentangle such social preferences from the influence that purely self-interested preferences exert on cooperative behavior in repeated games.   However, this interpretation of the experimental evidence concerning one-shot games has itself been challenged by several defenders of SIRG. Since this challenge has important implications for how we should best explain co-operation it will be worth considering in some detail. 
  		1.6. Challenges to the Existence of Social Preferences. The challenge begins with the claim that most real-life social interactions are best modeled as moves in a repeated game in which accurate information about previous play is available to most of the players.  In other words, it is claimed that genuinely one shot games are rare in real life.  This is particularly likely to be true (it is claimed) in the small scale societies or groups in which human beings lived through most of prehistory since these are groups with relatively stable membership in which the same individuals interact repeatedly, face similar dilemmas again and again, and generally have accurate information about one another’s behavior. (It is sometimes also suggested that as a consequence of this, our cognition and motivation have been shaped by natural selection as adaptations for repeated interactions and that we are not well adapted to one-shot interactions or that we inevitably construe them in terms appropriate to repeated interactions.​[5]​)
It is further suggested that the upshot of  all this   is that when subjects play a one -shot game in the laboratory,  it is likely  that their choices  either  (a) will be   confused (because of their unfamiliarity with  the game they are playing)   and/or (b) that their choices  will   reflect the   importation of  patterns of behavior or heuristics, or norms   that derive from  their experience in playing some repeated game that looks similar to the laboratory game .  (For later reference, I will call claim (b) the importation thesis.) In either case, subject’s behavior cannot be taken as evidence for their possession of non- self- interested preferences. Under (a) their choices will not reflect stable, coherent preferences of any kind, self-interested or non-self-interested. Under (b), cooperative behavior in the one-shot game also cannot be taken as evidence for their possession of non-self-interested preferences, since it will merely reflect the importation of strategies that are appropriate for self-interested players in the repeated game. As an illustration, suppose subjects are presented with a one-shot game in which monetary payoffs to each player have the structure of a PD and that the subjects behave cooperatively. If subjects  are purely self-interested, but model this interaction as a repeated game and import   cooperative strategies like tit-for-tat that are equilibria of this repeated game (for self- interested players), then we have an explanation of why they cooperate that does not require appeal to non-self-interested preferences.  It is true, of course,  that  experimenters go to considerable lengths to make sure that subjects understand (that is, at a conscious level) that they are playing a one shot game and to try to control for concerns about reputational effects that might lead subjects to treat the game as repeated.  Thus for the importation thesis (b) to be credible, it should be interpreted as claiming   that despite their intellectual recognition that the game is one-shot, subjects   nonetheless import (as a result of something like unconscious processing, implicit learning, or perhaps the triggering of innate dispositions ) patterns of play from similar looking repeated games. 
	An additional prediction that is at least suggested (if not strictly entailed) by this portion of the SIRG  analysis is this:  Suppose we have a one-shot game in which  subjects cooperate only because they import cooperative strategies supported by self interest from a similar looking repeated game. Then, if the one-shot version of this game   were   played over and over again, but with different partners, one would likely see a decline (and probably a very steep decline) in cooperation. This would be because (on the SIRG account) one would expect that subjects would gradually learn that (that is, come to model the interaction as though) they were playing a one-shot game and the behavior which is appropriate to the repeated game would gradually be replaced with behavior   that is appropriate to the one-shot game—e. g., defection in a one-shot PD, assuming the players are motivated only by self interest​[6]​.   
 		Binmore (2007) in fact claims that one does see just this pattern in many experimental games and he takes this to support the SIRG account. He   points out  that subjects who repeatedly play one-shot PDs against different partners become more likely to defect as the game goes on: the defection rate goes from an initial rate of 40 –60%    to nearly 90%  defection.  A similar patterns is observed with subjects who play a rotating one-shot public goods game (a so-called stranger treatment, with the group composition changed every time period) -- here also contributions decline over time (although, interestingly, it is controversial and the evidence equivocal whether the decline is more or less steep than the decline in contributions in repeated public goods games with the same subject (so-called partners treatment)).   Binmore takes this to be evidence  that  subjects gradually learn the structure of the one-shot game with repetition and  converge  on the Nash equilibrium (mutual non cooperation), which is just the behavior that the  SIRG account predicts.
	2. 1. Conditional Cooperators. The extent  of the support  that these observations provide for the  SIRG account depends of course on the extent to which there are alternative, non-SIRG accounts of subjects motivation that predict the same behavior – that is, the extent to which it is only the SIRG  account that predicts this behavior.   In fact, there is an alternative account (or really, a family of accounts) that, as we shall see, has independent evidential support. This is that a substantial portion of the subjects are conditional co-operators of one sort or another. For the purposes of this paper,  conditional co-operators are people with   the following features: (1) they   will co-operate even when  this is not the pay-off maximizing choice if (but only if) enough others with whom they are interacting also co-operate or are expected (by the conditional cooperators)  to co-operate. For example, they will cooperate in a one-shot PD or on what is known to be the last move of a repeated PD.  (2) They will impose costs on non-cooperators (either through failure to cooperate or through sanctions of some other sort) when this is not pay-off maximizing. For example, they will reject low offers in one-shot ultimatum games and will punish free riders at a cost to themselves in the last round of a public goods game. The general category of conditional cooperator covers a variety of more specific possibilities: some subjects may begin by co-operating and   defect only against those who have previously defected,  as in the standard tit-for-tat strategy. Other subjects may begin by cooperating but then defect more indiscriminately (even against those with whom they are interacting for the first time) whenever they have experienced enough defections by others. (There is experimental evidence that a significant number of subjects behave in this way.)  Still other subjects may begin by defecting (or by not interacting at all, if that is an option) and only begin cooperating if they observe a sufficient amount of co-operative play by other subjects. Similarly different subjects may have different thresholds for sanctioning. Note that conditional cooperators differ not only from subjects whose preferences are entirely self-interested, but also from subjects whose preferences are unconditionally altruistic – that is, subjects who have preferences to benefit others regardless of the behavior of those others. For example, unlike CCs, unconditional altruists will never reject positive offers in a one-shot UG in which reputational concerns about possible future interactions etc. are not an issue since this makes both players worse off than acceptance. Similarly, unlike CCs, unconditional altruists who maximize some function of both players’ payoffs may cooperate in a PD in which the second party defects, provided that the gain to the second party is large enough. 
	An alternative explanation (besides the SIRG account) for the decline in co-operation when repeated one-shot games are played is that this is due to the interaction between two different types of subjects, both present in significant numbers: subjects who, because they have purely self-interested preferences (or for some other reason), are prepared to defect or free-ride when others cooperate and subjects who will  make non-payoff maximizing cooperative choices in some circumstances, but who will decline to cooperate (even with new partners) after they have   experienced a sufficient number of interactions in which their partners have behaved non-cooperatively (perhaps especially when they themselves have behaved cooperatively). With such a combination of subjects, the rate of cooperation among conditional cooperators will decline over a series of one- shot interactions as they encounter more and more defectors. 
	2.2. Evidence for Conditional Cooperation. There are a number of converging pieces of evidence that suggest that there is at least some truth in this alternative account. Ahn, Ostrom, and Walker (2003) asked subjects to state their preferences regarding outcomes in one shot double blind prisoner’s dilemmas, both involving simultaneous and sequential moves. In the simultaneous move version of the game, 10% of subjects ranked the mutually cooperative outcome (C, C) higher than the outcome in which they defect and their opponent co-operates (D, C).  Another 19% said they were indifferent between these two outcomes, despite the fact that the latter (D, C) outcome is payoff maximizing for them.  In the sequential move game, forty percent of subjects ranked C, C) higher than (D, C) and another 27 per cent said they were indifferent between these two outcomes.  Lest these be dismissed as mere survey results, Ahn et al also report results from behavioral experiments that are broadly consistent: 36 per cent of subjects cooperated in the simultaneous move game, and in the sequential game, 56 % of first movers cooperated and 61% of second movers cooperated when first movers cooperated, despite the fact that the latter is not the pay-off maximizing choice. Ostrom comments elsewhere that these results “confirm that not all subjects enter a collective action situation as pure forward looking rational egoists” and that “some bring with them a set of norms and values that can support cooperation”    (2005, p. 129). However, she also adds that   
	Preferences based in these [cooperative] norms can be altered by bad experiences. One set of 72 subjects played 12 rounds of a finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game where we randomly matched partners before each round. Rates of cooperation were very low. Many players experienced multiple instances where partners declined to cooperate (Ahn, Ostrom, and Walker 2003). In light of these unfortunate experiences, only 19 percent of the respondents now ranked (C, C) above (D, C) while 17 percent were indifferent (ibid.). In this uncooperative setting, the norms supporting cooperation and reciprocity were diminished by experience, but not eliminated.  (2005, p 129). 
This comports with my suggestion above: a number of subjects are conditional cooperators, but of the sort that will defect even against a new partner if they have sufficient experience of defection themselves. 
	A number of other experimental studies suggest a similar picture of subject’s preferences. 
	2.3. Heterogeneity of types and endogenous grouping: Further support for this general picture is provided by a series of experiments involving grouping effects in repeated public goods games. A representative example​[7]​ is an experiment conducted by Page, Putterman, and Unel (2005)   in which subjects were given information every three rounds about the contributions of other subjects in previous rounds and also an opportunity to express preferences about future partners. Subjects whose mutual rankings were the lowest (with a low ranking meaning that a partner is most preferred for cooperation) were then organized into a first group; those whose rankings were intermediate were organized into a second group and so on, for a total of four groups. In other words, the result was that  those who had  contributed most in previous rounds played the next three rounds among themselves, those who had contributed at an intermediate level were organized into a second group and so on, down to a fourth group that consisted very largely of free riders. The result of this “endogenous grouping treatment” was that the average level of contribution across all groups (70%) was much higher than the average level of contribution in a baseline treatment in which there is no regrouping (38%).  Moreover, average levels of contribution varied   greatly across the groups, with this following the order of group formation – that is, contributions were highest and continued to be so in the first group formed of   high cooperators and are lowest in the fourth group: in the first group, 50 percent contributed their entire endowment in the final period (with the corresponding numbers from the second, third and fourth groups being 43, 18, and 0).  
	   Like the experiments reported by Ahn et al., this experiment also suggests that subjects are heterogeneous and differ in type, with  some  concerned only to maximize their personal pay-offs and  others appearing to be some form of conditional cooperator​[8]​. Evidence for this comes from the observation that across all four groups, 59% contributed at least something in the last period, even though the dominant strategy for pay –off maximizing is to contribute nothing in the last period​[9]​.   Evidence for subject heterogeneity and the presence of a significant number of conditional cooperators is also provided  by the great differences in the levels of cooperation across the four groups – if  there  are no differences of some kind, it is hard to see why the grouping treatment should be so effective in fostering different levels of cooperation.  
  	A second general conclusion that is suggested by this experiment is that understanding the interaction between different types appears to be important to understanding when and why cooperation occurs. If conditional cooperators are forced to play with people who are prepared to free ride (and there is no punishment option or other treatment which will encourage more cooperative behavior—see below), then cooperation will decay​[10]​. If instead, conditional cooperators are able to interact only with others who have been cooperative in the past, much higher levels of cooperation can be sustained. Presumably this happens for several reasons. To begin with, this grouping procedure allows conditional cooperators to interact preferentially with each other.  Second, it provides an incentive for self-interested players to mimic conditional co-operators (at least until the final round of play) or to signal that they will play as if they are cooperators and in this way to obtain the benefits of interacting with them. This confirms the point, noted earlier,  that it matters  a great deal, in understanding cooperation, whether repeated interaction is forced or whether people have a choice over who their potential partners will be. More generally, the structure of the interactions between different types of players and hence the institutions that mediate this have a major influence on the extent to which cooperation occurs. 
	2.4. Repeated public goods games with punishment.   When a costly punishment option is introduced which allows subjects in a repeated public goods game to specifically punish individual non-contributors but at a cost to themselves, a number of subjects will punish, even in the final round, in which punishment cannot influence future behavior. Moreover, introduction of this option prevents the decline in contributions with repeated play that is seen an ordinary repeated public goods game.   Indeed, humans are willing to engage in so-called third party punishment, in which an outsider or third party punishes (at a cost to himself) uncooperative or unfair behavior involving   other parties, even though this behavior does not disadvantage the punisher.  For example, third observers will punish unfair or uncooperative behavior in a DG or PD involving two other players (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004).  
	This suggests several points. First, note that willingness to punish, particularly in the final round, does not have an obvious interpretation in terms of purely self-interested play—instead it suggests a disposition to engage in negative reciprocity in response to non-cooperative play by others. Second, the results from games with punishment again seem broadly consonant with the alternative explanation considered above (in terms of heterogeneous types, one of which is conditional cooperators) of the decline in contributions in   ordinary public goods games without punishment. This is that the decline occurs because the subject population contains both conditional cooperators and free riders. When the former behave cooperatively and the latter free ride, the only way the conditional cooperators can retaliate is by withholding contributions themselves, but when they do so, this of course indiscriminately punishes all other co-operators as well, leading to an unraveling of cooperation. What the introduction of the punishment option does is to make it possible for retaliation to be directed specifically at non-contributors and this both encourages potential non-contributors to cooperate and makes non-contribution less attractive as a retaliatory measure. 
	2.5. Restart effects:  Suppose that a repeated game public goods game is “restarted”—that is,  play is stopped after e.g. ten   rounds and subjects are then told that a new  ten round  repeated game will begin (with the same partners) (Cf. Andreoni, 1988).   During the first ten rounds, contributions decline just as they do in an ordinary repeated public goods game. However, the effect of the restart is to temporarily boost contributions—that is, the average level of contribution is much higher in the eleventh round (which begins the “new” game after the restart) than it is in the tenth round which ends the old game. Note that this is again   prima-facie   inconsistent with an interpretation according to which subjects are gradually learning, through repeated play that zero contribution is their best strategy. If they have learned this fairly well by the end of the tenth round, why do they suddenly forget it and begin contributing at a higher level when the game is restarted?   
	An alternative interpretation of the restart effect is that there is some substantial population of people who view the restart as an opportunity for the group to make a fresh start and break out of a bad pattern of declining contributions.  In other words, they contribute when the restart begins as part of an attempt to signal anew their willingness to contribute if others are willing to do so as well; their increased level of contribution is an attempt to get others to change their behavior and no longer free ride.  Of course this explanation assumes a particular kind of conditional co-operator: one who is willing to begin cooperating anew with the restart​[11]​.
 	2.6. Field Studies. The picture suggested by these experimental results is also supported by field observation.  In her classic study, Ostrom (1990) suggests a number of features shared by successful cooperative arrangements involving Common Pool Resources (CPRs. Two of these features are particularly relevant to our discussion.  First, it is crucial that the CPR be governed by rules that clearly define who has access rights and which allow for the exclusion of opportunistic outsiders.  Second, there must be a system which allows for the monitoring and sanction of those who breach the rules governing use of the CPR. These features correspond to the experimental observations that cooperation will decay under repetition if there is no way for cooperators to exclude or avoid interaction with free riders and that cooperation is much more likely to be sustained if non-cooperative behavior  is detected and sanctioned.  The general picture that is suggested by Ostrom’s study is again one in which there is heterogeneity of types and in which sustaining cooperation requires rules and institutions that protect the more cooperative types from free riders.  The explanation of sustained cooperation thus   requires reference to these rules and institutions and not just to the presence of repeated interaction among self-interested types. 
	2.7. The Role of Intentions. The experiments  considered so far suggest that some significant number of subjects are conditional cooperators in the sense that respond to cooperative behavior with cooperative behavior and uncooperative behavior with non-cooperative behavior even when it is not pay –off maximizing to do so. Other experiments suggest that the subjects do not just reciprocate other’s behavior but respond to (what they believe to be)   the intentions with which others act.   










In figure 1, player 1 has an outside option -- she can move across, ending the game and ensuring a payoff of (20, 20) for herself and her partner. Alternatively, she can move down in which case, her partner has a choice of moving across, with payoffs (25, 25) or moving down with pay-offs (15, 30). Player 1’s choice to move down is thus a “trusting”    move in the sense that she foregoes a certain pay-off in order to give   her partner an opportunity to choose an alternative that is better for both, but also trusting that her partner will not choose down, producing an outcome that is better for player 2 but worse for player 1. Thus by choosing down instead of across, player 1 communicates to player 2   her intention to trust player 2 to choose across.   A natural hypothesis about interactions of this type, due to Philip Pettit (1995), is to suppose that under the right conditions Player 1’s trust can help to induce player 2 to behave in a trustworthy manner and that when Player 1 moves down, she acts with this intention.  That is, Player 1 hopes or expects that her intention to trust Player 2 (expressed by moving down) will be recognized by player 2 and that as a result of recognizing this intention, player 2 will be more likely to move across than player 2 would be in the absence of the communication of this intention. 
Now compare this with the  game in figure 2, which is just like the game in figure 1, except that the outside option has been removed—player 1’s only choice is to move down. Because of this, player 1’s move down cannot communicate to player 2 an intention to trust player 2. Supposing that something like Pettit’s analysis is correct, this removes one of player 2’s motives to move across: the motive of reciprocating the trust shown by player 1.  As a result, one would expect that player 2 would be more likely to choose down in the version of the game without an outside option than in the version of the game with an outside option. As the numbers attached to the game trees (which give the proportions of players a choosing each alternative at each node) this is indeed what is found— the difference in choices of down vs. across by player 2 across the two versions of the game is significant at the 0.01 level. 
Notice that this difference in behavior across the two games is not predicted by    models of subject’s preferences that attribute their behavior to unconditional dispositions to cooperate or benefit others or by models that take subjects to care only about the outcomes they receive. Such models predict that there should be no difference in the proportion of player 2s choosing across versus down across the two games since the   outcomes for both players under these two choices are the same across both games.  
	Additional evidence for the role of perceived intention in influencing behavior in contexts involving the possibility of co-operation comes from experiments conducted by Falk, Fehr, and Fishbacker, 2003, although here it is negative reciprocity which is illustrated.  These authors had subjects simultaneously enter choices for each of four mini-ultimatum games (MUGs) – these are ultimatum games in which the proposer faces a binary choice between two alternatives which the responder may   either accept or reject,    with both players getting nothing in the latter case. In  each game,  one of the choices for the   proposer  is (8,2) but the other option varies among  (10,0),  (8,2) (5,5), or (2,8). Unsurprisingly, Falk et al. observe that  responder’s behavior is strongly influenced by the alternatives available to the proposers, just as second player behavior in the trust game described above is influenced by  perception of the alternatives available to the first player  -- presumably this is because these alternatives influence the intentions or motives with which the proposer is perceived to act. For example, rejections are much more common when the propose chooses (8, 2) when the alternative is (5, 5) than when the alternatives are (10, 0) or (2, 8). This is exactly what one would expect if second movers detect and respond to first mover’s intentions, assuming that intentions and motives depend on alternatives that are not chosen as well as those that are chosen: most responders will regard a   choice of 8, 2 over 10, 0 as revealing a kinder or less hostile intention on the part of the proposer than a choice of 8, 2 over 5, 5. Again, by contrast, if responders care only about outcomes, they should reject  the choice of an 8,2 split at a constant rate  across these games​[12]​. 
	3. 1.  Models of Cooperative Behavior: Introduction.   At this point I want to step back a bit and ask the following question:  If people exhibit the kinds of behavior described above (if at least some are conditional cooperators), how should we model their behavior? Since the structure of this portion of my argument will be somewhat complex, I begin with an overview of what I attempt to show. One obvious strategy, explored by a number of economists, for modeling cooperative behavior is to assume that people have “social preferences” – that is, preferences that are not purely self-interested in the sense that pay-offs to others figure in people’s utility functions, but that are like self-interested preferences in the sense that they are well-behaved and stable at the individual level across different situations and contexts. I focus in 3.2, for illustrative purposes, on what is perhaps the best known proposal along these lines—the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). I will argue that this whole approach suffers from certain fundamental limitations: as an empirical matter, people’s utility functions, at least when parameterized in the way that Fehr and Schmidt suggest, are not stable across different games. Moreover, one important reason for this is that the purely outcome –oriented or consequentialist character of the utility function they propose is inadequate to capture the reciprocal behavior of conditional cooperators.
	Sections 3.2- 3.4  then explore  the question of what would be required to adequately capture the preference structure of conditional cooperators, assuming that a purely outcome-oriented model is inadequate.  My intention here is not to propose an original positive theory, but rather to show how complex any successful model must be and how much information it must incorporate.  In particular, I will contend, following Rabin (1993) and others, that empirically adequate models of reciprocal behavior must incorporate information about the beliefs and intentions of other reciprocators into  subject’s utility functions; that is, to adequately explain their behavior, we must assume that the utility that they get from various interactions depends on, among other things, the intentions and beliefs with which other players act. This in turn has the further consequence that very specific background information (about, e.g., baselines with respect to which kind or hostile intentions can be identified) must be shared among the players – in the absence of such shared information, conditional cooperators will find it very difficult to predict one another’s behavior and hence to successfully cooperate.  As I then argue in Section 4, one role of shared norms and institutions is to supply such background information. This raises an explanatory quandary which is explored in Section 5: On the one hand, norms and institutions are themselves the product of human cooperation; one would like an account framed in terms of the beliefs and preferences of individual agents which explains how these emerge and are sustained. On the other hand, if those agents are conditional cooperators, it appears that to adequately model their behavior we require reference to preferences and beliefs that already embody information about norms and institutions.   
	3.2. Social Preferences: Inequity Aversion as an Illustration. The overall strategy of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is to  assume that people have  stable utility functions in which pay-offs to others as well as to self figure as arguments and then use this assumption to explain other regarding behavior.  Suppose that X =  x1. xn represents the monetary allocation among each of n players. Fehr and Schmidt   propose that the utility of the ith player for this allocation is  
Ui (X) = xi-ai/n-1∑max [xj-xi, 0]-  bi/n-1 ∑max[xi- xj,0]
where the summations are for j≠i and bi ≤ai and 0 ≤bi ≤ 1. The utility of the ith player is thus a function of the monetary pay-off he receives  and two other terms,  the first reflecting how much i dislikes  disadvantageous inequality and the second term reflecting how much i dislikes  advantageous inequality, the assumption being that i dislikes the former more than the latter. The parameters ai  and  bi measure how sensitive i is to each form of inequality and are assumed to be relatively stable characteristics of individuals.   
Adopting the assumption that subjects have stable utility functions of this form, Fehr and Schmidt try to “measure” or estimate subjects  ais, and bis  from their behavior in one set of games (ordinary ultimatum games) and then use this information to predict behavior in other games, such as an ultimatum game with responder competition, and public goods games with and without punishment. Such prediction should be possible if subjects have stable social preferences. Although they claim some success, their project suffers from two serious limitations, both of which are instructive for our discussion. 
	First, contrary to what Fehr and Schmidt claim, there is little evidence for coefficient stability even across the limited class of games they consider. The data from UGs on which they rely does not allow for reliable point estimation of the values of the coefficients ai and bi and it is only by making additional and very ad hoc assumptions about the values and distribution of these parameters that Fehr and Schmidt are able to produce results that are   consistent with (but not really predictive of) play across different games.  More natural assumptions suggest that the coefficients change in value across games​[13]​. 
	Second, as Fehr and Schmidt  explicitly recognize, their utility function  assumes that subjects care only about outcomes (for themselves and others),  even though it is clear from the experimental evidence described above that subjects also care about  the intentions and previous play of the other subjects with whom they are interacting. For example, according to the Fehr Schmidt model, trustees should behave in exactly the same way in both versions of the trust game devised by McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith (Figures 1 and 2 above) . Indeed, trustees should also choose in the same way in a dictator game in which there is no previous move by the trustor and the trustee must allocate 3x between himself and the trustor in circumstances in which it is known that the trustor already has n-x, since according to the Fehr/Schmidt model, the trustee’s allocation should depend only on his degree of inequality aversion, and not (independently of this) on the trustor’s previous choice.  Both casual observation and experimental results show that many subjects do not treat these situations as equivalent: because they are conditional cooperators, subjects are more generous to others who have allocated money to them via a previous move in a trust game than to subjects who have not made such a move.   Presumably, it is at least in part because many subjects are conditional cooperators (and hence care about intentions, previous play etc.) that purely outcome based utility functions like Fehr/Schmidt’s are predicatively inadequate.
It is worth observing that similar limitations infect  some of the  most popular normative theories  of other-regarding preferences  in the philosophical literature, at least insofar as these are construed as descriptive of people’s  actual preferences.  Like the Fehr/Schmidt model, many of these theories are also purely outcome oriented (and in this respect, consequentialist)—they don’t capture the idea that people often care not just about outcomes, but also about the intentions of other players and that, because they are conditional cooperators, they may evaluate the same pattern of pay-offs (both for themselves and others) quite differently depending on the choices of others that preceded this pay –off.   This focus on outcomes is characteristic, for example, of versions of utilitarianism according to which utility is measured by monetary pay-offs (or by some monotonically increasing function of those pay-offs) for   those affected. Similarly for a theory that says that people’s social preferences should be to maximize the pay-off of the worst-off person or group, independently of the intentions they exhibit​[14]​. When treated as descriptive claims about people’s preferences, such theories imply that subjects will (contrary to actual fact) treat McCabe et al.’s two version of the trust game as equivalent to each other and to the trustee dictator game described above.  Similarly, such theories recommend acceptance of any positive amount in a one-shot UG (assuming that reputational effects can be neglected), since rejection makes both players worse off.   Notice that the problem under discussion is distinct from the problem posed by the fact that such theories also make what are probably unrealistic assumptions about how unselfish people are. Even if we confine ourselves to people’s non-self - interested preferences, such theories leave out important components of the structure of such preferences -- the components that underlie conditional cooperation. The result is that such theories are descriptively inadequate as accounts of people’s social preferences​[15]​.    
		3. 3. The structure of reciprocity. My suggestion so far (which I take to be illustrated by the failures of the Fehr/Schmidt model) has been that purely outcome based utility functions are inadequate as models of the preferences of conditional cooperators – instead we require models that incorporate information about subject’s intentions and beliefs. In what follows I want to explore some of the complexities that arise when we try to do this. I emphasize again that my intention is not to try to construct an adequate positive model of reciprocal preferences, but instead the much more modest one of arguing that once we attempt to incorporate information about beliefs and intentions into subject’s utility functions, we also find that we apparently must incorporate context specific information that makes reference to background norms and institutions.  The remarks that follow are heavily influenced by Rabin (1993) (which is easily the most sophisticated and psychologically realistic treatment available) but are intended to be generic—they also reflect   common assumptions about modeling reciprocity found elsewhere in the literature. 
		 Let us focus  for simplicity on a two person extensive form game and  think about it in the following way: player 1 has a choice of different actions or strategies and then player 2 chooses in response to these,   with the joint choices a1, a2 of 1 and 2 determining the  material payoffs ∏1, ∏2 for both players.  1’s choice a1 expresses an intention toward (or sends a signal to) 2, an intention that may be more or less “kind”, cooperative or trusting (or alternatively hostile or uncooperative). 2 acquires from this a belief –call it b2 - about the intention or signal that 1 is attempting to express. This belief in turn   influences   2’s choice of a2  in response to a1 —that is, b2 is an argument in 2’s utility function in addition to 2’s material payoff ∏2.   Moreover, 1 is aware of this influence of b2 on a2 and chooses her own action a1 with an eye to this influence, forming a belief c1 about the belief b2 that will be induced in 2 by her (1’s) choice of a1. Similarly player 2 has beliefs about the beliefs that 1 is attempting to induce by her choice a1 and so on.
		    In principle, then, player’s assessments of one another’s kindness will depend not just on their material payoffs  but also in part on their assessments of one another’s intentions and on their expectations about one another, and they choose in accord with utility functions that represent this information.   However, in order to gain tractability, most analysts begin in one way or another with a purely outcome-based characterization of what it is for one player to behave kindly  and then attempt to complicate or extend to their analysis to reflect the role of intention and expectations.    Proceeding in this way, let us characterize player 1’s kindness toward player 2 in choosing a strategy a1  as follows: first,  establish  some reference  or neutral point which is a possible pay-off for 2 – let this be  2 (x0) .  The kindness of 1 toward 2 will then depend on the difference between the payoff 2 (ma1)  that is the maximum payoff that  2 can achieve for himself,  given  that 1 has chosen a1, and  2 (x0): that is, is 1’s kindness toward 2 is measured by 2 (ma1) -2 (x0). In other words, 1’s choice of   a1 will be kind or unkind according as to whether it places 2 in a position in which 2’s pay-off maximizing response is above or below the reference pay-off ​[16]​. (If desired, this expression can be normalized in some way—e. g., by dividing by the difference between 2’s maximum and minimum pay-offs under a1.) 
		  This raises the obvious question of how the reference pay-off is to be determined.  The analysis would be greatly simplified if  the  reference pay-off  for   player  j  could be specified as  some context-independent function of   possible alternative pay-offs just to   j,  where this does not depend on  the pay-offs and intentions of the other  player i, bringing this latter information  (which is obviously relevant to how j responds to i’s choices)  into the analysis in some other way.  Rabin (1993) adopts this strategy, suggesting that j’s reference pay-off might be taken to be the average of the maximum and minimum pay-offs for j ​[17]​. However, as many of the above examples suggest,  it  seems more empirically accurate and psychologically plausible to follow  Cox et al., 2007  in allowing  the reference  point for player i to be influenced by (among other considerations) the alternatives available to j  elsewhere in the game. For example, 1’s choice of (8, 2) in the 5-5 MUG described above seems much more unkind than 1’s choice of (8, 2) in the 10-0 game and this assessment is reflected in the much higher rate of rejection of the   8-2 split in the 5-5game. Presumably, this is because of the availability of the alternative (5.5) in the former game as compared with the alternative (10.0) in the latter game. Similarly, the choice of take in the 2-8 game seems less unkind in than the choice of take in the 5-5 game.  What this suggests is that in a realistic, predicatively adequate model of reciprocity,   the reference pay-offs for each player will   vary with the details of the structure of the game being played so that choices of the same final allocation across different games will vary in the kindness and unkindness that they express depending on the structure of the rest of the game 
		3.4. Property Rights. Another set of considerations that suggest that reference points must be specified in a context-dependent way that depends on the particular game being played has to do with what Cox et al (2007) call status or property rights. For example, when subjects are assigned the role of proposers in ultimatum games (UGs) on the basis of their performance on a pre-game quiz, they make lower offers (in comparison with UGs in which there is no such pre-game treatment) and these offers are   accepted more often. Within the reference point framework described above, the effect of the quiz is to shift both players’ reference points in such a way that proposers are not seen by responders as behaving unkindly when they keep more for  themselves, and as a consequence, responders are less likely to reciprocate negatively by rejecting the offer. Put slightly differently, one function of reference points   is to specify what one player may expect of another as a “reasonable sacrifice” that constrains purely self-interested play and this will be determined contextually by prior rights and by the alternatives available to each player—for example, many would suppose that it is “reasonable” to expect the proposer in a UG to sacrifice by forgoing making an offer of  (10, 0) when (5, 5) is an alternative but not when (1, 9) is the only alternative​[18]​.  
		4.1. Implications for Modeling Conditional Cooperators. What does all this imply about attempts to write down utility functions that describe the choices of interacting conditional cooperators?  It seems to me that what it suggests is that although rough qualitative prediction may be  possible in the absence of  detailed information about reference points,  and property rights,  both theory and experiment  imply that precise  predictively useful quantitative predictions   requires  utility  functions that  incorporate  such information.   This in turn requires information about background norms and institutions.   Of course one might hope for a general quantitative theory that allows one to somehow derive all such background information from assumptions that do not presuppose any background information about norms—that is, a theory which explains why (or allows one to predict that ) particular  reference points etc. emerge and are sustained in different situations. But at present we lack such a theory and there is an obvious puzzle about how we might get it or what form it would take, if my remarks above are correct. The puzzle is that understanding the behavior of conditional cooperators (and hence appealing to that behavior to explain the existence of background norms etc.)  already apparently requires at least some of the information about norms and institutions that we were hoping to explain, thus threatening a kind of explanatory circularity. For the moment, however, I want to put aside this issue and simply observe that as far as our present level of understanding goes, it looks as though assumptions about reference points and so on need, as it were, to be put in by hand on a case by case basis, reflecting cultural knowledge that seems local or specific to individual games, rather than anything that we can derive from general theory 
		This makes it hard for theorists to model interactions involving reciprocity or conditional cooperation in a non-ad-hoc way, but it also has another consequence. This is that, in the absence of the right sort of local information, it may be very difficult for the players themselves to predict in detail how other players will behave, even in the heavily idealized case in which each player is some form of conditional cooperator, believes the other players to be conditional cooperators, and so on. Or, to put the point more cautiously, to the extent that the players are able to successfully predict one another’s behavior, they are likely to be relying on something more than general beliefs about the extent to which others are motivated by a general taste for reciprocity or conditional cooperation, combined with information about the general type of game they are playing and their own and other player’s pay-offs. Instead, they must be relying on additional information that is more specific to the individual game they are playing – information about reference points in the above representation.   I will suggest below that one function of  social norms is to supply this  game specific information – that is, it is norms that specify reference points, tell us whether an alternative strategy available to a player involves a reasonable or unreasonable sacrifice and so on.   
 		Another related factor which may make it difficult for players to predict one another’s behavior derives from the way in which (as we have seen) conditional cooperators are influenced by their  beliefs about other’s choices, intentions and beliefs.    Suppose that player 1 does not expect player 2 to reciprocate kind behavior and that as a consequence 1 does not behave kindly toward   2. If (a) 2 believes that 1 fails   to behave kindly toward him only because 1 believes that 2 will not reciprocate, this may well lead 2 to a different assessment of 1’s behavior (and a different response to it) than   if (b) 2 believes that 1 believes that 2 would reciprocate if 1 were to behave kindly and also believes that 1 has chosen to behave unkindly despite this belief. In the former case (a) if 2 is a reciprocator he may try to take steps to change 1’s beliefs (perhaps by continuing, at least for a while, to behave kindly toward 1); in case (b)  2 may decide to negatively reciprocate 1’s unkindness.   Similarly, suppose that 1 causes some outcome that  benefits 2, but 2 believes that  1 did  not choose  to produce this outcome  because he wished to benefit 2; instead 2 believes that 1  caused the outcome accidentally  or  that player 1 chose   the  action while unaware  that it would benefit 2 or without  caring about this.  To the extent that 2 is a reciprocator, he presumably will be less likely to reciprocate 1’s behavior with an intentionally kind response in such cases (in comparison with cases in which player one’s kindness is perceived as intentional.) Finally,  consider cases in which   1 intends to behave kindly toward 2  and chooses an  action which he (1) believes will be believed by 2 to be kind or beneficial but  that in fact 2 does not regard the action as kind. In this case also, 2’s response will depend not just on his beliefs but perhaps also on his beliefs about what 1 believes and so on. For example, in a trust game, the trustor may believe that sending $3 (out of a possible $10)  will be viewed as a  kind and trusting choice, while the trustee may regard anything less than $5 as indicating distrust. Similarly, a payback (e.g., of slightly more than the amount invested) that is regarded by the trustee as kind, trustworthy, or generous may not be so regarded by the trustor.  This in turn will affect the trustor’s future behavior toward the trustee.   
		More generally, to the extent that the players who are conditional cooperators are uncertain about one another’s beliefs and expectations, and yet nonetheless understand that these will influence each other’s behavior, this introduces an additional level of unpredictability into the whole interaction and makes it even more difficult to fully anticipate exactly how others will behave (at least in the absence of the sort of game specific local knowledge described above). Within Rabin’s framework this shows up in the fact that for many games there are a very large number of fairness equilibria and these are often very difficult to compute (indeed the required computations may be intractable).






If, for the sake of argument,  we regard any trustor who sends a positive amount as a conditional cooperator,   then, in the “no history” form of the game  30 out of 32 proposers are conditional cooperators,  but the  amount they send shows a great deal of variation –  amounts sent and number of subjects sending that amount are as follows ($10,5), ($8, 1), ($7, 3),  ($6,5), ($5,6), ($4,2), ($3,4), ($2,2), ($1,2).  Looking at the response of the trustees, we see  that a sizable portion of trustees are free riders or near free riders - of the 28 trustees who received more  that $1, 12 returned either $0 or $1. However, in the same group of 28, 11 returned more than they received.  Taking the latter to be conditional cooperators of one sort or another,​[20]​  figure  3 shows  there  is considerable variation in the amount returned both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the amount invested even among  this group. Again I take this to reflect, in part, the absence of any clear norm about what the right amount to return even among those who wish to behave reciprocally. The presence of a sizable (but not exactly known) proportion of free riders also of course contributes to making it difficult for the players to accurately predict one another’s behavior. 
	A non- experimental illustration of these points is provided by Avner Greif’s well-known study of   commercial relationships among the Maghribi – a group of Jewish traders in the Mediterranean who flourished in the eleventh century (Greif, 2006.)  These traders employed agents to oversee the sale of their goods in foreign countries, but faced the problem of ensuring that these agents did not act inappropriately with the goods in their care—e.g. by embezzling them or selling them for prices that were too low. Appropriate behavior was enforced by a “grim trigger” strategy: an agreement among the merchants not to ever hire again anyone   as an agent who once cheated one of the merchants in the community.  However, to be most effective agents needed to have considerable discretion, based on their judgment abut local conditions, in selling the goods and this meant that it was by no means obvious in the abstract what sort of actions amounted to cheating or dishonesty.   According to Greif, this problem was solved, at least in part, by reference to a body of customary rules- a “social norm”- known as the merchant’s law, that “defined what actions [on the part of the agents] constituted appropriate conduct.” (2006, p. 59). He also remarks that   the effectiveness of the merchants’ threat of collective sanctions “depend[ed] critically on a common cognitive system that ascribes meaning to various actions, particularly actions that constitute cheating.” (2006, p. 69). In other words, even if the merchants are conditional cooperators with a general willingness to punish “cheating”, in order for this disposition to be effective in enforcing cooperative behavior a common understanding, specified by as set of social norms and shared by both merchants and agents, of what sort of behavior amounts to cheating is required. Similarly, even if agents wish to be cooperative, such norms are required for agents to know what sorts of behavior will be perceived by merchants as cooperative and for merchants to be able to anticipate and assess the behavior of their agents. 
	4.2. Norms as a Solution to the Problem of Unpredictability. Let us assume that, for the reasons just described,   that there are circumstances in which (in the absence of norms) it is difficult for   groups of conditional cooperators to predict one another’s behavior or accurately infer one another’s motives and intentions.  What are the likely or possible consequences of this unpredictability when conditional cooperators find themselves in such circumstances? It seems obvious that it can easily lead to the decay of cooperation even among those who are well disposed to cooperating. In such circumstances, subjects who intend (by their lights) to behave cooperatively will make choices that strike others as uncooperative (or insufficiently cooperative) prompting non- cooperative responses, failures to coordinate in optimal ways, and so on.  This will be particularly likely to the extent that  (as we may safely assume is usually the case) even subjects with preferences that incline them toward conditional cooperation will also be influenced by self- interested preferences  which will incline them to interpret  cooperative requirements in self-serving ways, so that while they recognize, e.g., that if they have received a positive amount in a trust game, they should provide some return,  they will find it easy to  persuade themselves that it is appropriate to return less rather than more.  Similarly, when some subjects behave uncooperatively, conditional cooperators with a disposition to negative reciprocity will impose sanctions of some kind or other, but this doesn’t settle the question of what the character or magnitude of those sanctions will be, or exactly when they should be imposed.  To the extent that the character and magnitude of sanctions is unpredictable and disagreements arise about their appropriateness, there will be a further danger of decay of cooperation. 
	  An obvious solution to this problem is the establishment of systems of social norms, (rules, and institutions) to govern cooperative interactions​[21]​. Such norms will specify the terms of cooperation in various kinds of interactions in a much more detailed and precise way than the very general guidelines about returning cooperation with cooperation and non-cooperation with non-cooperation that characterize conditional cooperators as a qualitative type. For example, such norms will specify how much one should contribute   in a particular kind of public goods interaction such as the Harambee, and what sanctions should be imposed if some one fails to contribute in accord with this norm. Similarly, they will specify (within the subject’s particular social group) what is a cooperative or kind offer in an ultimatum game and what is not—and hence which offers call for a non-cooperative response. My assumption is that in the sorts of contexts that we have been discussing,  the behavior specified by norms will usually involve conditional (rather than unconditional)  cooperation and hence will draw on  pre-existing general preferences for conditional cooperation (among other motivations). However, I also assume, for the reasons given above, that these preferences will be relatively qualitative and indeterminate in the absence of specific norms – that is, people’s preferences for conditional cooperation will not by themselves (and in the absence of any particular norms) dictate anything very specific about how much they should contribute in a particular kind of public goods game, how much they should return in a trust game, and so on. Norms are required to supply this specificity and because of this, rather different systems of norms governing cooperation will arise in different groups, consistently with many of the members of those groups having some qualitative dispositions toward conditional cooperation. Relatedly, even among members of the same group, the norms governing one sort of interaction may be very different from those governing other interactions that may look (to outsiders) rather similar. Thus subjects may conform to, e.g., food-sharing norms that require a high degree of generosity but exhibit no such generosity in other contexts where the relevant norms do not require sharing. (Cf. Ensminger, 2004, p 359.). 
	As noted above, the empirical evidence suggests that, to be effective, norms governing cooperation usually must be accompanied by sanctions for norm violations, which may be either formal or informal.  This is closely connected to the fact that norms are regarded by those whose behavior is regulated by them as not mere regularities in behavior but rather as prescriptions that establish how one ought to behave. The violation of norms thus at least calls for criticism or censure of some kind, in which violators may be directly told they should act differently, may be subject to adverse gossip, damage to their reputations, ridicule, and withdrawal of social contact or support and so on.  Of course, it may also lead to other, more formal liabilities and to physical punishment. As a number of writers have observed, the willingness of humans to sanction others even when it is not in their self-interest to do so and even when they are not directly adversely affected by the norm violation appears to play a central role in the maintenance of systems of norms – this is reflected both in the role that punishment plays in maintaining stable levels of cooperation in experimental games and in the fact that most working systems of cooperation observed in the field include sanctions of some kind for  free -riders.  This is not to say, though, most people conform to norms only because of a desire to avoid sanctions. Instead, many different motivations seem to be at work in norm –compliance—see below. And one important role of sanctions is to reassure conditional cooperators (who are not themselves motivated entirely by fear of sanctions) that their cooperative tendencies will not be taken advantage of by more selfish types. It is also one of the factors that allows for a certain arbitrariness in exactly which norms get established in connection with a given cooperative problem— our general willingness to sanction can be employed to support any one of many different systems of norms​[22]​.    
4.3. Normative Guidance.  The picture for which I have been arguing is one according to which the establishment of norms (rules, institutions etc.) and human willingness to comply with or be guided by these plays an important role in the high levels of cooperation we are able to achieve. General dispositions toward conditional cooperation may be necessary for the achievement of cooperation, but in the absence of guidance by norms, they are far from sufficient. In the absence of norms, we  find it difficult to predict one another’s behavior or even to gauge accurately whether others are behaving (or are intending to behave) cooperatively or not. We deal with this problem by making our behavior more predictable and interpretable by creating norms, rules, and institutions​[23]​.  Let me conclude by trying to put this idea in more general perspective and also drawing attention to a problem that it creates for the project of trying to explain the emergence and continued existence of norms and institutions in terms of the beliefs and utilities of individual actors and their interactions. 
As a point of departure, consider with a rough contrast between two types of belief/desire (or expected utility) explanations. The first appeals just to beliefs and desires that can be specified independently of norms​[24]​.  These will include desires for generic goods that are shared by virtually everyone, regardless of cultural background: desires for food (of some kind or another), shelter, avoidance of physical harm, etc. Arguably, many self-interested preferences fall into this category. Norm –independent beliefs will  include  veridical beliefs about the physical environment that are likely to be acquired by virtually any one, regardless of cultural background,  with normal perceptual and reasoning abilities who is awake and attentive.  Also in the category of  norm-independent predictions/explanations are those that appeal to desires that are not universally shared and are not supported by a preference to conform to some norm but are nonetheless fairly stable for a given individual across some range of contexts —for example, stable individual level personality traits (assuming these exist) such as shyness and novelty-seeking. 
The belief/desire predictions/ explanations just described contrast with those that advert to beliefs and desires that are norm-dependent in the sense that either (a) they can’t be specified independently of facts about norms or (b) people are unlikely to possess them in the absence of certain norms or (c) we lack information that would allow us to reliably ascribe them in the absence of information about norms.  For example, if we wish to predict/explain the detailed behavior of a customer and waiter when the waiter orders food in a restaurant, this will almost certainly require appeal to norm-dependent beliefs and desires   — shared beliefs and desires about the norms governing such interactions,   specifying e.g.,   how the customer requests certain food (by telling the waiter about his order rather than barging into the kitchen), when payment is expected, tipping, and so on.   General, norm-independent information about, e.g. the subject’s food preferences or the waiter’s desire for income will not allow us to predict or explain the details of their interaction. My suggestion is that to adequately explain the detailed behavior of conditional cooperators, we must similarly appeal to norm-dependent and not just norm-independent beliefs and preferences.  
As already remarked, this creates a problem about a kind of explanatory circularity. On the one hand, rules and institutions are the product of people’s interactions, both cooperative and competitive.  We would like to be able explain why these emerge and are sustained by reference to the activities and choices of individual agents, which are in turn   explained by  those agent’s preferences, beliefs, and other psychological states -- for example, by exhibiting these rules and institutions as equilibria of some repeated game, given suitable psychological assumptions about the agents playing that game.  On the other hand, realistic psychological assumptions about individual agents seem to require that many of them be modeled as conditional cooperators. Moreover, as we have seen, to explain or model the cooperative activities of conditional cooperators we seem to be required to ascribe norm-dependent preferences and beliefs to them. But then we are in danger of presupposing, in our characterization of the agent’s beliefs and preferences, at least some of the facts about the existence of rules and institutions that we would like to explain. This potential circularity could be avoided if we could explain the behavior of agents in terms of preferences and beliefs that are not themselves principle-dependent and then show how norms and institutions emerge from the interactions of such agents, but given the arguments made above, it is not obvious that this can be done. 
My concern in this section has been simply to argue that conditional cooperators require norms and institutions if they are to cooperate successfully; I have not tried (and am certainly unable) to provide a general explanation of how such rules and institutions emerge and are sustained. So I will not try to resolve the issue described in the previous paragraph, except to remark that insofar as the problem is genuine, it constitutes a challenge only to a very ambitious explanatory enterprise—that of providing a completely general theory of rules and institutions that explains their existence and emergence just in terms of the interactions of agents whose psychology can be characterized in norm-independent terms.  More modest explanatory enterprises are left untouched. To take only the most obvious possibility, it may be possible, by assuming the existence of some background norms and institutions, in the form of norm-dependent preferences and beliefs, to use these in conjunction with other assumptions (including assumptions about norm –independent beliefs and preferences) and game theoretic analysis, to explain the emergence or existence of other  different norms and institutions.  This is in effect what Greif does. Cooperative behavior (and solutions to principal agent problems) among the Maghribi merchants is sustained in part by a system of collective sanctions which presumably draw on self-interested motives as well as perhaps a general willingness to punish transgressions, but to, as we have seen, these in turn depend upon a background legal system (the merchant’s law) which characterizes what will count as dishonest behavior. These background norms are in effect presupposed in Greif’s explanation of the cooperative institutions established and maintained by the Maghribi. To assume the existence of these background norms is in effect to presuppose that certain patterns of cooperative behavior are already in place, but the resulting explanation is not perniciously circular since the aspects of the cooperative behavior of the Maghribi that Greif seeks to explain are not those that are presupposed in appealing to the existence of the merchant code​[25]​. 
4.4. The Psychology Behind Conformity to Norms. Implicit in the picture of cooperation that I have been defending is   the assumption that people can learn to follow or conform to norms.  I will not try to provide a general theory of what this capacity involves, but a few clarifications may be helpful​[26]​. First, my discussion assumes  that people are motivationally quite heterogeneous, both in the sense that different motivations play a role in different people’s behavior and that the same individual may be influenced by different motivational factors, both at the same time and in different mixes over time​[27]​. For example, someone may behave cooperatively in a situation in which others are cooperating as well both because she is influenced by preference for conditional cooperation and by self –interested preferences. The latter may include both purely instrumental considerations having to do with  securing future monetary pay-offs by signaling a willingness to cooperate now, but it may also be that  the subject derives utility from  being well-regarded by others or from conforming to what most others are doing.  Perhaps also the subject derives a reward from norm compliance per se.  It may be unclear both to others and even to the subject herself what the relative role of these various factors is in influencing her behavior. 
Second,  for the same reasons that  predicting people’s behavior in cooperative interactions   on the basis of their norm-independent preferences and beliefs is extremely difficult, I also assume that it is often difficult to  identify  interventions  or manipulations of  people’s norm –independent beliefs and preferences  that will reliably alter their  behavior in cooperative contexts in precise ways.   
Third, I assume we are so psychologically constituted that there is a way around this difficulty: we can create norms (either explicitly and deliberately, as a result of discussion, negotiation and agreement or as a result of more informal processes involving the gradual adoption of shared customs and expectations or through some combination of these) and we can get ourselves and others to conform to them.  Requiring/expecting that people conform to (or be guided by) a norm thus can function as what John Campbell (forthcoming) has called a control variable: it is a particularly effective (and often readily available) point of intervention that allows us to alter our own and other’s behavior in precise, targeted ways. Depending on the circumstances, establishing and appealing to norms in order to influence people’s behavior   can be more effective that trying to influence behavior by appealing to or manipulating norm-independent beliefs and preferences. In invoking norms in this way, we in effect   say to others (and to ourselves): we don’t care about the exact details of the psychological processes by  which you accomplish this, but we expect you to get yourself into a psychological state such that you conform to such and such a norm. We may also add that we expect you to   influence others to conform to the norm, to adopt a critical attitude to norm violations and so on.  Because the intervention asks only that people conform to the norm  and exhibit attitudes and behavior  that support the norm, it need not require detailed knowledge of preferences and beliefs that exist independently of and prior to the institution of the norm.   
     At present we have little understanding   of what the   processes underlying normative compliance and guidance   (and the motivational plasticity that apparently accompanies this) involves in mechanistic or neurobiological terms.  However, it is a natural conjecture (supported by some evidence— see, e.g.  Spitzer et al. 2007 and the references therein) that the neural basis for this capacity involves  frontal structures like ventrolateral and    dorsolateral cortex (known to be involved in inhibition,  impulse control, and emotional regulation)  and ventromdeial and orbitofrontal cortex (involved in the processing of complex social emotions) as well as anterior cingulated (conflict resolution) and the  extensive projections forward and back from these frontal structures to  from reward processing structures  like dorsal striatum and the caudate nucleus. These projections not only enable reward structures to influence the frontal structures involved in higher level thought,   decision making and conflict resolution but also allow the latter structures to in turn modulate and alter reward structures, so that we can learn to find even very abstract concerns not based in immediate biological needs (e.g., a trip to Mecca, or for conformity to norms mandating non-cheating on taxes) to be rewarding and motivating. 
 4.5. Empirical Implications. Suppose that we accept the idea that people are sometimes guided by norms in cooperative endeavors. What distinctive patterns of behavior should we expect to see when this occurs in laboratory games and in the field? First and most obviously, to the extent that behavior in the laboratory is guided by norms, we should expect to see some correspondence between laboratory behavior and norms that can be recognized as   at work in the field, as with the public goods games played by the Orma.  When this is the case, it seems appropriate to think of   the laboratory game as measuring    in part the influence of this   norm – “in part” because play in the laboratory game will be influenced, at the individual level, by many other factors as well, as evidenced by the fact that in many cases there is considerable individual variability in degree of norm adherence, and norm adherence in general tends to be weaker under conditions like anonymity. 
	Presumably, when (or to the extent that) a norm is operative, it should be possible to identify it independently of laboratory play; there should not just be a regularity in behavior in the field corresponding to the norm, but subjects should   exhibit behavior  showing   they recognize the norm.   (This might show up under inquiries about what people should do in various situations, in the treatment of certain behaviors as deviations from the norm, in criticisms or sanctions of such deviations, and so on.) Claims that norms are at work in guiding behavior thus will be more plausible in some situations than in others. For example, it is a plausible empirical conjecture that among contemporary American populations, a norm is at work in an ordinary UG that proscribes a highly unequal division of the stakes.  On the other hand, consider an asymmetric  UG in which the stakes are in the form of chips which are worth twice as much to the proposer as to the responder; a fact that is known to the proposer but not to the responder.  In such games, on average proposers offer a roughly equal division of the number of chips and hence a highly unequal monetary division, which responders accept (cf. Bichierri, 2006).  Although it is   an empirical question whether there is a distinct norm in the contemporary US which permits a very unequal monetary division of the stakes in this asymmetric information version of the game, this seems unlikely. It is more plausible to think instead either that the same norms (relatively equal division) govern play in both an ordinary UG and the asymmetric information version or that no norm at   all governs play in the latter game. In either case, the difference between proposer’s play in the asymmetric information game and an ordinary UG will be best explained not in terms of conformity to a norm but rather by some model in which the proposer is influenced by self-interest to take advantage of the informational asymmetry to achieve an unequal   monetary division.  
		  Next, to the extent that people’s behavior is influenced by norms, it should exhibit some distinctive patterns that will differ from those we would expect if their behavior were primarily influenced by norm independent social preferences —at least on simple and straightforward versions of the latter approach.   Other things being equal, there should be more variability of individual behavior in games in which it is not clear (for the subject pool) what the relevant norm is or in which there are competing norms  than in games in which there is a single governing norm.  In the latter case, one might expect to see a “spike” in frequency of behavior conforming to the norm, with behaviors that do not conform to the norm generally occurring less frequently, although there may also be another spike at whatever behavior corresponds to self-interested play. When there are a small number of  competing norms that govern the interaction, this should show up in a somewhat discontinuous frequency distribution of behaviors that cluster around the competing norms, with lower frequency of behavior in between norms – i.e.,  bimodal or polymodal distributions. In general, variability in behavior should decrease as more context is supplied which plausibly can be regarded as cuing a particular norm. 
		As concrete illustrations,  it is arguable that in societies like  the contemporary U. S.,  the norm or norms  that apply to dictator games (DGs) are weaker or less salient than those that apply to UGs  -- indeed, some would say that unless further context is provided there are no clear norms for proposer behavior in a DG.  If this is correct, then on a norm- based approach, one should expect (ceteris paribus, of course) more variability in proposer behavior in   DGs than in  UGs.  On the assumption that one of the norms governing UGs  mandates an equal split, one should see a number of proposer offers at this value. On the other hand, on a norm-based approach, there is no particular reason to expect a spike at offers of, e.g., 0.39 of the stake in a UG, since presumably there is no norm that suggests this exact division—if such a division is observed, this will be because the proposer just happens to trade off pay-off to self, the utility of norm conformity, and whatever other preferences she possess in such a way as to generate this result. In fact, in conformity with these expectations, one does observe an increased frequency of offers around 0.5 in UGs in developed societies (although  there are intermediate  offers as well) and more variance in DGs than in UGs.  Similarly, on the assumption that a UG corresponds to something like a “take it or leave it” offer between two strangers in real life, one might expect that there will be clearer norms governing such offers  in societies with substantial experience of bargaining, trade, and market exchange with relative strangers than in societies lacking such experience. If so and such norms influence behavior in UGs, one would expect less variance in proposer offers in the former societies than in the latter. A number of the papers in Henrich et al. report just this pattern​[28]​ .  
		On the other hand, within a model that explains cooperative behavior in terms of norms, it will be entirely possible that even rather similar-looking interactions are governed by different norms.  To the extent this is so, we should not   expect norm adhering subjects to play in a similar way across such games – that is, to exhibit any very strong stability of type across similar-looking games. For example, if the norms governing play in a UG are different from those governing play in a DG, with the former cuing norms involving bargaining and the latter norms involving “giving” or unconditional charitable donation, then unless there is some   reason to think   that proposers who are sensitive to one norm are likely to be sensitive to the other (and that both norms require generous behavior on the part of proposers) there will no general reason to  expect proposers who make generous offers in a DG to do so in a UG.   The absence of such a correlation between proposer behavior in UGs and DGs will be likely if, for example, a substantial number of proposers   understand the norm governing UGs as not making considerations of generosity relevant at all – that because the context involves bargaining, any offer that the responder will accept is appropriate -- while by contrast,   DGs carry with them implicit expectations to exhibit some level of generosity. It is of course an empirical question to what extent such a hypothesis about the norms thought to govern UGs and DGs is correct, but to the extent that it is, we should expect little correlation in generous behavior at the individual level across the two games. ​[29]​  For similar reasons, we should expect that behavior will differ across groups which are subject to different norms, even when they play the “same” game—which of course is what is found in the Henrich et al. study.   
		More generally, to the extent that subjects are influenced by norms we should expect some degree of similarity of play in the same game across different subjects, provided these subjects are drawn from a common group or culture in which the same norms are operative, but not necessarily consistency of type of play among individuals   across games governed by different norms. (The similarity of play across different subjects in the same game reflects the fact that to at least some extent motivationally heterogeneous subjects will be able to get themselves to conform to the same norm.)
  		By contrast,  to the extent to which  self-interest and norm-independent social preferences alone are sufficient to explain behavior and subjects are not influenced by norms, we should expect correlations in play at the individual level and (absent some special reasons for expecting otherwise) variance in individual behavior within a society.   Both theoretical and empirical considerations suggest that there is no particular reason to expect everyone to have the same norm- independent social preferences. So, on the hypothesis that behavior is governed by norm-independent social preferences, then, even within a single game where there is an opportunity to express social preferences, there should be considerable variation in subject behavior. Moreover, although advocates of the social preference approach have had relatively little in general to say about what distribution of types of preferences we should expect (presumably because they regard this as an empirical matter), there is no obvious theoretical reason (at least absent additional assumptions) why this distribution should be discontinuous or clumpy in any particular way rather than relatively continuous. Thus   there is no obvious reason why, in a UG, many more subjects should have norm –independent social preferences (say in the form of some degree of inequality aversion) that lead them to offer 0.5 rather than 0.45 of the stake.   On the other hand, there should be some non-trivial consistency of type at the individual level across games—so that one can use behavior in ultimatum games to predict behavior in other games, as Fehr and Schmidt attempt to do. 
 		5. Conclusion. The patterns of behavior we actually observe seem to be a mixture of the two “ideal types” just described (that is,   behavior that is purely norm-governed and behavior that is entirely due to norm-independent preferences.)  Although there is substantial empirical evidence for an important influence of norm-based preferences as well as theoretical arguments that people must be influenced by such preferences if they are to achieve stable cooperation,   it is also obvious that norm-based preferences are not the whole story in explaining cooperative behavior.   Even in cases in which  there are clear norms applying  to some interaction, people may vary considerably in the degree to which they adhere to  them, with some being more willing than others to violate norms, particularly  (but not only) in order to satisfy self-interested preferences. Both casual observation and more systematic investigation support the conclusion that people are sensitive to the costs to themselves and perhaps to others incurred in conforming to norms and are more willing to violate norms as the benefits of doing so increase​[30]​. Adherence to norms (and motivation by social preferences more generally) also becomes attenuated as anonymity increases and is strengthened under arrangements that make information about behavior more public. And of course, there are many situations in which there are no clear norms governing behavior at all, so that unless subjects import norms from other situations that they judge to be similar or create norms to govern the new situation, their behavior will not be norm-governed. 
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^1	  That is, it is a Nash equilibrium, assuming that the players care only about the monetary pay-offs to themselves. In what follows, when I speak of various games as having Nash equilibria, I will mean (unless explicitly indicated otherwise) equilibria that are Nash on the assumption that the players care only about their own monetary pay-offs. I will also largely ignore various refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept (subgame perfect equlibria etc.) in what follows because I think that in most games of any complexity there is little empirical evidence that subjects actually choose in accordance with such equilibrium notions. That a mutual choice of cooperative strategy is a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game is an implication of the so-called fork theorem which says, roughly, that under the conditions envisioned above any possible outcome (including cooperative outcomes) in     which  each player’s minimax condition satisfied (each player minimizes his maximum loss) is a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game . 
^2	  For example, as described by Binmore (1994) in a simulation by Linster, the Grim strategy of defecting forever in response to a single defection takes over more than half of the population. 
^3	  Similar points are also made in Tullock, 1985 and Vanberg and  Congleton 1992.  Mantzavinos, 2001 also emphasizes the importance of considering games with an exit option. 
^4	  Of course there are cases in which the representation of an interaction as a mandatory repeated game is completely appropriate.   If you and I are marooned on a very small desert island, with only one limited source of water, we face a forced interaction over the distribution of the water and one which is repeated as long as both of us remain alive.  My point is simply that not all cases in which co-operation occurs have this structure. Sometimes whether there is repeated interaction at all should be regarded as endogenously determined.
^5	  The extent to which it is true as an empirically matter that virtually all interactions in small scale or “primitive” societies are non -anonymous and repeated is contested;   see e. g., Gintis, 2006. There is also disagreement about how common genuinely one-shot   interactions are in contemporary large scale societies.
^6	   Or at least one would expect this pattern unless one were prepared to claim that subjects are so fixed and inflexible in their behavior that they cannot unlearn strategies that have once been learned or that it takes an enormously long time for this to happen – assumptions that game theorists tend to reject in other contexts.)
^7	    There are a number of other experiments reporting results that are consonant with those reported by Page et al.  For example,  Gunnthorsdttir, McCabe, and Houser (2000) sorted players into cooperators or free riders based on their play in an initial public goods game. Players were then either (1) divided into groups depending on their contributions (with the highest contributors  grouped together, the next highest contributors grouped together etc. ) and  then played a  repeated public goods game or (2) alternatively,   played repeated public goods games under a random grouping condition in which there is no sorting.  The public goods games are played under a variety of MPCR (marginal per-capital return) conditions – that is, different rates at which money is distributed to group members as a function of individual contributions. The authors find that, in the random grouping condition and for all MCPRs in every round, co-operators (as typed by the initial sorting) contributed more on average   than free-riders,   suggesting that the initial sorting captured some stability of type in subjects’ behavior.  Under the random grouping treatment, when cooperators and free-riders interacted, Gunnthorsdttir et al found the characteristic decay in aggregate contributions to the public good over time that is reported in other experiments. They also found that   “Almost all of this decay can be attributed to decay in cooperators’ contributions”.  By contrast,  there were much slower rates of decay   under the treatments in which there was sorting into groups and  cooperators met free-riders less frequently,  although in these cases, decay rates are  (unsurprisingly ) lower under high MPCRS. Indeed, Gunnthorsdttir et al found that   “by sufficiently reducing cooperators' interactions with free-riders… at least when the MPCR is not too low, cooperators’ public contributions were sustained”. The natural interpretation of these results is again that co-operators respond to interactions with free riders by reducing contributions but that such reductions do not occur if interactions with other cooperators are sufficiently frequent. Other experiments supporting a similar picture in which a substantial subset of players condition their contributions on their beliefs about the contributions of other players are reported in Burlando and Guala (2005) and Croson (1998). 
^8	  A major tradition in social psychology emphasizes the extent to which behavior is influenced by situational or environmental variables rather than fixed personality traits.    The observation that there is   also evidence for some consistency of type at the level of individual behavior when the same or very similar games are played is not in conflict with these claims, but does constitute an interesting addendum to them.
^9	  Of course it might be argued (in line with the SIRG account) that contributions in the last period are instead   due self-interested players who are   “confused” or unthinkingly import previous patterns of play into the last period. Nonetheless, it is interesting that these same players are at least stably confused etc. since they behave in a similarly cooperative way the first round. 
^10	  Page et al. draw attention to an experiment study of grouping a public goods game by Ehrhart and Keser (1999) in which unlike the Page et al experiment, subjects were allowed to move unilaterally from one group to another without the agreement of the group being joined. Unsurprisingly, free riders attempt to join groups containing high contributors, with the result that contributions decline over time.   
^11	  Thanks to Francesco Guala for helpful correspondence regarding this effect. 
^12	   Why should conditional cooperators (or, for that matter, self-interested types) care about the intentions of those with whom they interact, rather than just the outcomes they receive? A natural hypothesis is that at least part of the explanation is that intentions provide information about the likelihood of future cooperative interactions: someone who not only benefits me but intends that I receive this benefit or chooses the benefit in part because it will benefit me (rather than providing it inadvertently or as a mere byproduct of some purely self interested choice) reveals a kind or favorable disposition toward me that may manifest itself in future favorable treatment. Someone who makes a choice that    reveals a hostile intention toward me is typically more likely to make choices that harm me in the future than someone whose behavior has a negative impact on me, but who exhibits no hostile intention. My conjecture is that this information about future cooperativeness figures in our psychic economy in both a calculative, instrumental way and in a non-instrumental “reactive” way. In the former role, we react positively to kind intentions because we consciously recognize that they signal an increased probability of future cooperative benefits. However, independently of this, it is also likely that we have been wired up by some combination of natural selection and past learning to react in a non-instrumental way to the intentions others display toward us: this selection/learning has occurred because intentions convey information about future behavior, but we don’t have to go through a process of conscious calculation when we react in this way. Instead, we have fast, automatic “reactive attitudes” (in the sense of Strawson) toward other’s revealed intentions that influence our utility and our responses to others, independently of our evaluation of outcomes.It is worth noting that it’s a feature of deontological moral theories that they assign an independent significance to the intentions with which actors act, in addition to the outcomes they produce. Many consequentialists claim that there is something unreasonable about this. The experimental evidence described above seems to suggest that deontological theories are better descriptions of what people actually care about than purely consequentialist theories. Moreover, the evidence described above gives consequentialists a reason to care about the intentions with which people (including themselves) act. People’s perceptions of other’s intentions influence how they react to others choices and hence the overall consequences that are produced. 
^13	  For details, see Shaked, 2007 and for additional discussion, Woodward, forthcoming. 
^14	  This is not intended as a criticism of Rawls’ theory since Rawls makes it clear that his difference principle is meant to apply only to the basic structure of society and is not intended as a guide to individual choice. Nonetheless the values and normative commitments that underlie the difference principle seem, prima facie at least, to be rather different than those that underlie conditional cooperation. An explicitly conditional version of Rawls’ principle of fairness (“To the extent that others contribute to a cooperative scheme and you benefit from this, you are required to contribute as well”) seems to come closer to capturing the commitments of a conditional cooperator.   
^15	  Of course, this leaves open the possibility that the theories in question may be normatively defensible despite their descriptive inadequacies – that is, that they are adequate theories of how we ought to choose or judge even if they are inadequate as theories of how we do choose. On the other hand, normative theories are often defended in part on the grounds that they capture or represent what we in fact care or about or value (or underlying features of our intuitive judgments) . When assessed on these grounds, theories that leave out the kinds of considerations that motivate conditional cooperators seem normatively inadequate.Let me also add that I do not deny that people have preferences over outcomes for others in circumstances in which there is no possibility of conditional cooperation with those others. For example, given some good which is to be divided among other people   with whom one is not involved in any sort of reciprocal interaction (as in, e.g. a pure case of charitable giving), people will certainly have preferences for how the good is to be divided and   it is a further empirical question whether utilitarianism, inequity aversion,   maximin and so on provide a descriptively adequate characterization of those preferences. What I deny is that these preferences for unconditional distributions (as we might call them) are good models of the preferences of conditional cooperators or that they explain the facts about conditional cooperation on which I focus in this essay. People behave very differently (and in accord with different preferences) when they are faced with issues of conditional cooperation than when they are faced with choices among unconditional distributions. 
^16	  Versions of this strategy are followed by  Rabin , 1993, Cox et al.,  2007,  and Guala, 2006.  For example Cox et al write ” A natural specification for the reciprocity variable [that is, the variable that measures reciprocity] is r(x)= m(x) – m0, where m(x) is the maximum pay-off that the second mover can guarantee himself given the first mover’s choice x and m0 is m (x0) where x0 is neutral in some appropriate sense”  (2007,  pp. 22-3)
^17	  A similar strategy is suggested by Guala, 2006 who takes i’s kindness toward j to be measured by the difference  j receives under i’s choice of strategy and some alternative reference payoff that j could have received if i had chosen differently, but does not suggest that this reference pay-off for j in turn depends on the alternatives available to i and the pay-offs to i associated with these.
^18	   Similar background assumptions about reasonable sacrifice are ubiquitous in the moral domain: it is generally thought reasonable to expect that one will save a drowning child at the cost of soiling one’s clothes, but perhaps not if this involves substantial risk to one’s own life. 
^19	  Readers might ask themselves how much they think that they “should” send if they were in the position of trustor and how much they should return if they were trustees. In the latter role, is one behaving cooperatively as long one returns more than one is sent? Or does cooperative behavior instead require a more generous response—e.g. an even split of the amount generated by the investment, so  that if the initial endowment is e and the amount invested i,   the trustee returns 3i/2, with the trustor   getting e-i+3i/2= e+i/2  and the responder e+3i/2? Or should the responder return 2i, so that each player ends up with an equal amount (e+i/2)?  Or should the responder return even more, since, after all, the risk associated with the interaction is borne entirely by the trustor? In this connection it is worth observing that in the results reported in the version of the trust game from Berg et al. described in figure 3,  out of the 11 trustees who returned  more than invested, 6 returned 2i or more, with the remainder returning an amount intermediate between i and 2i that bore no obvious relationship to i.      
^20	  Obviously this is a very permissive stipulation about who counts as a conditional cooperator. My guess is that many trustors will not regard trustees who return only slightly more than they receive as kind or cooperative. 
^21	  For a detailed study of social norms and their role in fostering cooperation, see Bicchieri, 2006. I am much indebted to her discussion.
^22	   Indeed some writers (e.g. Boyd and Richerson, 1992) claim that punishment can stabilize virtually any system of norms.   This strikes me as implausible as an empirical claim—stable systems of norms are unlikely to be supported just by a willingness to punish but will also need to fit with and be supported by pre-existing human motivations, including self-interested preferences and preferences for conditional cooperation.  The latter motivations are not infinitely variable or plastic. There is a reason why socialist norms of economic behavior did not work very well in the former Soviet Union, even when backed by sanctions. 
^23	  In other words, rather than thinking of the degree of predictability of human behavior as given or fixed, independently of the presence of rules and institutions, in the way that natural phenomena like planetary motions are, we should think of human predictability as something that we are able to affect by creating appropriate rules and institutions. To put the point more provocatively: rather than thinking of   folk   (or belief/desire) psychology as a theory that yields reliable predictions of human behavior in general, we should think of it instead as a theory whose predictive success (when present) depends in part on the existence of the right sort of background scaffolding—norms and institutions to which people conform.  
^24	  The contrast which follows has some affinities with Rawls’ contrast between “object dependent” desires and one subgroup of what he calls  “principle dependent” desires – the subgroup having to do with “reasonable principles”  that “regulate how a plurality of agents… are to conduct themselves with respect to each other” .   (Rawls, 2000), pp 45-48. 
^25	   Another way of putting the basic point, which I owe to Dan Hausman is this: if one confines oneself to norm-independent beliefs and preferences, then it is not easy to see what explanatory work could possibly be done by  appeal to norms. On the one hand, if the norm-independent preferences and beliefs are by themselves sufficient to explain norm conformity (e.g. because this is the equilibrium of some game that is being played) then any  explanatory role for  norms seems superfluous – norm adherence is an effect that is  explained in terms of norm independent beliefs and preferences, rather than a part of an explanation of behavior.  On the other hand, if player’s norm-independent preferences and beliefs are not sufficient to explain norm adherence and players do not have any other sorts of beliefs and preferences,  it is mystery why conformity to norms occurs at all. My solution to this dilemma is to suggest that there is another alternative—norm-independent preferences and beliefs are not sufficiently determinate to explain norm conformity by themselves and only become determinate when supplemented by knowledge and acceptance of norms.  
^26	  I’m in broad agreement with the general account of guidance by norms provided in Gibbard, 1990. This remains one of the best discussions of this notion that I know of.  
^27	  In some critical comments on an earlier draft, Chris Mantzavinos asks why I focus so heavily on motivational considerations rather than more purely “cognitive” factors in explaining norm compliance. This is a complex issue to which I cannot really do justice here. I certainly agree that  cognitive factors such as shared beliefs or “mental models” are necessary for the effective maintenance of norms – this is apparent in many of the examples discussed above. However, it also seems to me that the strong message of recent work in social cognitive neuroscience is that motivational, desiderative, and affective factors are crucial too and that furthermore this is dimension along which people can vary considerably. In particular facts about human emotional processing and   our capacities for emotional regulation  seem  central to the explanation of norm- governed judgment and behavior. For more on this general theme, see Woodward and Allman, 2007. 
^28	  Also relevant  in this connection are results reported in Guth et al. (2001) The authors  find  that in a MUG, proposers choose highly unequal splits much more often when an even split is replaced with a slightly uneven one. For example, given a choice between   (17, 3) and (10, 10), proposers choose (10, 10) half the time. When the (10, 10) option is replaced with (9, 11), responders   choose (17, 3) two thirds of time.  A natural interpretation of this result is that proposers are influenced by an equal split norm when conformity to it is possible, but that there is no obvious norm that tells them they should prefer (9,10) to (17,3). On a social preference approach, there must be an (unexplained) sharp discontinuity between proposer’s attitudes toward (10, 10) and (9, 11).It is also worth noting in this connection that a norm-based account might be used to provide a natural treatment of another experimental result due to Guth: that in three-person variants of an ultimatum game in which  the proposer makes an offer that distributes the stake between a responder with the usual option to reject and a passive third party with no power to reject, the passive party receives very little—much less than the responder and   less than the second party in a DG. If the three person UG cues norms involving bargaining (with any offer that will not be rejected being acceptable) rather than norms involving charity or fairness, this outcome is unsurprising. 
^29	  Henrich et al. (2004) draw attention to this sort of pattern in connection with the Orma. As noted, the Orma saw the public goods game as closely related to the harambee but, according to Henrich at al. saw no such connection between the ultimatum game and the harambee. The Orma also believe that wealthier households should make a larger contribution to the harambee than poorer households. Consistently with this, contributions in the public goods game but not offers in the ultimatum game are correlated with household wealth among the Orma. (Henrich et al., p.49). This is evidence that play in the public goods game is influenced by a social norm  associated specifically with the Harambee and not  just by a generalized social preference (e.g. favoring generosity) that is operative among the Orma and expresses itself in a stable way across different  games. Thinking of the behavior detected in the Henrich et al. experiments as due in part to the influence of norms also allows us to make sense of another, prima-facie puzzling empirical result. This is that degree of integration with the market is correlated with cooperative behavior across different societies but not within societies at the level of individuals.  In the nature of the case, norms must be widely shared within a given group (in part as a conceptual matter but also if they are to be effective in enhancing predictability and coordination). Provided one is a member of the relevant group, one is expected to conform to the norm, regardless of one’s idiosyncratic characteristics. So norm adherence should manifest itself in substantial uniformity of behavior within a society, regardless of individual characteristics, but allows for variation across societies. In particular, societies that are more integrated into markets may adopt cooperative norms that are shared within those societies even by individuals who are not personally integrated into markets.  
^30	  For example, Clark and Sefton, 2001 report evidence that the rate of defection by second movers in a sequential PD after the first mover has cooperated goes up as the benefits from defection increase. 
